South Dakota State University

Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Department of Economics Staff Paper Series

Economics

5-10-1994

The Effect of Joint-Product Export Smuggling on
Export Tax Policy
Scott Fausti
South Dakota State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper
Part of the International Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Fausti, Scott, "The Effect of Joint-Product Export Smuggling on Export Tax Policy" (1994). Department of Economics Staff Paper Series.
Paper 114.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper/114

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and
Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Open
PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact
michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.

The Effect of Joint-Product Export
Smuggling on Export Tax Policy
Scott Fausti 1
South Dakota State University
Economics Staff Paper 94-7
May 10, 1994

Papers in this series are reproduced and distributed to encourage discussion
of research, extension, teaching, and economic policy issues. Although
available to anyone on request, Economics Department Staff Papers are intended
primarily for peers and policy makers. Papers are normally critiqued by some
colleagues prior to publication in this series. However, they are not subject
to formal review requirements of South Dakota State University's Agricultural
Experiment Station and Cooperative Extension Service publications.

All correspondence should be directed to Scott Fausti, Assistant
Professor, Department of Economics, South Dakota State University, Scobey
Hall, Box 504A, Brookings, South Dakota 57007-0895.
1

Table of Contents

Introduction............................................................

1

Assumptions on the Exporting Firm and the Export Supply Function........

1

The Effect of Joint-Product Smuggling on Total Exports and Trade Tax
Revenues...... . .............. . .. . ........ . ..................... ...

2

The Effect of Joint-Product Smuggling on the Revenue-Maximizing Export
Tax Rate... . ....... . . . . ................................... ........

4

Federal and State Excise Taxes and Smuggling:

A Discussion.............

9

Swnmary.. . . .......................... . .. . .. . ............................

11

References....... . . ... . ..... . ........ . ............... ............. ......

13

Appendix. ................. . ..... . ..... . ........ .......... . . . . . . . ........

14

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION:
THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effect of joint-product export smuggling on the
revenue-maximizing export tax rate and tax revenue collection under the small
country assumption. The results indicate that the effect of introducing joint
product export smuggling is dependent on whether legal and illegal exports are
considered a substitutable or complementary activity for the exporting firm.
The results of the model are applied to the issue of cigarette smuggling
in the United States. The paper concludes that if legal and illegal interstate
trade in cigarettes are substitutable activities for firms in the wholesale
and retail tobacco industry, then states levying relatively high excise taxes
should reduce their tax rates.

This action will increase legal trade at the

expense of illegal trade and raise the level of tax revenue collected.
The proposed increase in the federal cigarette excise tax to fund health
care reform is also discussed within the framework of the paper's model. The
model suggests that a substantial increase in the federal cigarette tax may
generate over-invoicing of cigarette exports and thereby reduce the market
share of legal cigarettes.

A rise in the cigarette tax rate could therefore

have an ambiguous effect on tax revenues collected and jeopardize the funding
of the health care program. (JEL: Fl3, H26, H21)
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I. Introduction.
The smuggling of imports and exports is a common phenomenon in lesser
developed countries where high tariff or export tax rates are levied on traded
goods.

Trade taxes have a long history of being used as a revenue raising

device in the third world.
This paper expands on the work by Johnson (1972), Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1973),

Pitt (1981), and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) by examining

the effect of smuggling on trade tax rates and revenue collection.

A partial

equilibrium export tax revenue maximization model is presented in this paper.
The results of the analysis indicate that the introduction of joint-product
export smuggling alters the revenue-maximizing export tax rate.

It is

demonstrated that the revenue-maximizing tax rate and revenue collected will
rise or fall depending on whether legal and illegal trade are complementary or
substitutable activities, respectively, for the exporting firm.

II. Assumptions on the Exporting Firm and the Export Supply Function.
The country is assumed to produce a pure export good, and the domestic
export producing firm is assumed to be a price taker in the world market.
goal of the government is to maximize export tax revenue.

The

If firms in the

export industry engage in smuggling, then they produce a joint-product export,
assumed to be of the type described in the paper by Pitt (1981).1

Pitt

described a smuggling firm that produced a joint-product export good composed
of a legal export unit combined with an illegal export unit.

Pitt's smuggling

production function embodied a real resource cost associated with smuggling, a
1 A number of papers in the smuggling literature have developed joint
product smuggling models. For examples, see Martin and Panagariya (1984),
Thursby et al. (1991), and Fausti (1992).
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confiscation cost associated with smuggling, and legal trade as a cover for
illegal trade.

With respect to the model presented below, Pitt's confiscation

cost assumption is modified by assuming that confiscation revenues collected
by the government just offset the real resource cost of enforcement incurred
by the government.
The country's export supply function is assumed to have two possible
states of nature: 1) all firms engage in legal trade only; and 2) all firms
engage in joint-product smuggling. Under state 1, the export supply function
is assumed to be a function of the tax distorted world price of exports:
p f • (l-t)-P t. Holding the world price p f constant, the export supply function
is defined as L (t), L' (t) < 0, where t is the percentage tax rate levied on
exports.

Under state 2, the legal export supply function, L (t,S), is defined

as a function of the export tax rate and the smuggling supply function, S (t),
S' (t)> 0.

It is assumed that joint-product smuggling generates Pitt's price

disparity result, such that p s, the equilibrium price under state 2, is
greater than p t, the equilibrium price under state 1.

Finally, it is assumed

that all other factors affecting the legal export supply function under both
states of nature are held constant.

Ill. The Effect of Joint-Product Smuggling on Total Exports and Trade Tax
Revenues.
The first issue addressed is the effect of the introduction of jointproduct smuggling on total exports, legal exports, and tax revenue collection:

PROPOSITION 1. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will: 1) increase

total export production; and 2) have an ambiguous effect on legal exports.
Thus, the introduction of joint-product smuggling has an ambiguous effect on
tax revenue collection.
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The small country assumption made earlier implies that the demand for exports
is perfectly elastic. Assuming that the level of total export production (X) ,
after the export tax is levied but before smuggling is introduced, is equal to

(1)
After smuggling is introduced, the level of total export production is equal
to the sum of legal and illegal exports,
X 2 = Lz + S z .

(2)

Assume the supply of total exports has a positive relationship with the
price of exports.

The introduction of joint-product smuggling generates price

disparity, p s � p t _ This implies the production of total exports increases, X2
� X1 •

Substituting for X2 , we have Lz + S 2

�

X 1 , or equivalently, S2

�

X1

-

L2 •

The presence of smuggling implies that
S 2 � O.

Substituting for X1 produces inequality (3),
(3)

Inequality (3) demonstrates that the production of exports destined to be
marketed via illegal channels is greater than the change in the production of
exports destined to be marketed via legal channels.

However, as in Pitt's

paper, it can not be determined if the amount of X marketed via legal trade
channels increases or decreases. Therefore, the effect of smuggling on export
tax revenues is ambiguous.2 The above discussion establishes proposition 1.

2
Fausti (1992) used this approach to discuss the impact of smuggling on
total exports. Pitt (1981) , and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) also derive
ambiguous results for the effect of the introduction of smuggling on legal
trade. They indicate that the introduction of smuggling could actually
increase tax revenue collected.
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The preceding analysis is an alternative way of presenting Pitt's
discussion of tax revenue maximization.3

However, an interesting implication

of Pitt's tax revenue maximization analysis has been overlooked. Pitt
demonstrates that a positive level of smuggling may be necessary to maximize
tax revenue.

In order for a positive level of smuggling to increase legal

trade and tax revenues, i.e., L2>L1, legal and illegal trade must be
complementary activities for the exporting firm.
assumption for the Pitt type of smuggling.

This would be a plausible

However, for the Bhagwati and

Hansen (1973) type of clandestine smuggling, one would expect legal and
illegal goods to be substitutes.

If legal and illegal trade are assumed to be

substitutable activities in a joint-product smuggling model, then the
introduction of smuggling will reduce legal exports and tax revenue, L 1>L2 •
IV.

The Effect of Joint-Product Smuggling on the Revenue-Maximizing Export
Tax Rate.
The export tax rate is set to maximize revenues collected before joint-

product smuggling begins (state 1). Since it is assumed that the country
produces a pure export good, domestic consumption can be ignored. Domestic
production and thus export supply are solely dependent on the exogenous world
price for the exported good.

Any tax levied on exports must be fully absorbed

by domestic producers. Given this set of circumstances, the legal export
supply function as defined under state 1 is L (t).4

The government's total

revenue function is defined as,
3 See Pitt (1981, p. 453) for his discussion of tax revenue maximization
in the presence of joint-product smuggling.
4 If one assumes that legal trade is a function of the domestic price of
exports, L (P), and P - p f · (l-t), the results remain unaltered. The decision
to make legal trade a function of the tax was done to simplify the mathematics
presented in the paper.
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TR - t•P f •L (t) , define L'<O, where L'-dL/dt. 5

(4)

Total tax revenue is defined as tax revenue collected on exports
evaluated at world prices.

To determine the revenue-maximizing tax rate, the

first derivative (dTR/dt) is derived and set to zero in equation (5) and the
revenue-maximizing tax rate is given in equation (6),
(5)

t 0 - - (L/L') >0.

(6)

When joint-product smuggling is introduced, the government's total
revenue function is altered by replacing the legal export supply function L (t)
in equation 4 with L (t, S) .
and S (state 2) .

The supply of legal exports is now a function of t

Following the same procedure as above, the revenue-

maximizing tax rate in the presence of smuggling is derived,
TR - t 1 •P f •L (t, S) , and define S'>O, where S'=dS/dt. 6

(7)
(8)

t1 - -LI (Lt, + Ls·S') > 0.

(9)

In equations 8 & 9, the term Ls·S' captures the indirect effect of a marginal
change in the tax rate on the supply of legal exports. From the discussion
above, its sign is dependent on whether legal and illegal export trade are
substitutable or complementary activities for the exporting firm, Ls<O or Ls>O
respectively.

The partial derivative 8L/8t

Lt < 0 represents the direct

effect of a marginal change in the tax rate on the supply of legal exports.
5 It is assumed that in the absence of smuggling, tax revenue collection
is a cost-less activity for the government. The tax revenue generated by the
export tax is assumed to increase, attain a maximum and then decline as the
tax rate rises.
6 It is assumed that the real resource cost associated with government
enforcement against smuggling is exactly offset by the confiscation revenues
collected by enforcement officials.
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Under the assumption that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, t 1
> 0.

Equation (9) brings the discussion to proposition 2:

PROPOSITION 2. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will reduce the

revenue-maximizing tax rate if BL/85<0, increase the revenue-maximizing tax
rate if BL/85>0, and leave it unaltered if BL/85-0.
To establish proposition 2, the ratio
t1/to = (-L'/L)· (-L /[Lt,+Lg • S'])

L' /[Lt,+Lg• S']

(10)

is examined under the following assumptions: 1) 8L/8S - O; 2) 8L/8S <0;
and 3) aL/as >

o.

When Lg= 0, it indicates that the exporting of legal and illegal goods
are unrelated activities. This implies that once the exporting firm decides to
engage in smuggling, the amount the firm decides to smuggle is independent of
the amount it decides to export via legal channels.

While this assumption is

intuitively unappealing, it implies that the ratio in eq. 10 reduces to L'/Lt_.
To simplify the analysis it is now assumed that the legal trade supply
response to a change in the export tax rate is the same under both states of
nature, L'=Lt, .

Under this assumption t 1/t0

-

1, and this indicates that the

introduction of joint-product smuggling has no effect on the revenue
maximizing tax rate.
When it is assumed that Lg< 0, the implication is that the exporting of
legal and illegal goods are substitutable activities for the exporting firm.
This implies that once the exporting firm decides to engage in smuggling, the
amount of legal trade it engages in declines, reducing total tax revenues
collected. Also when Lg< 0, the ratio t 1/t0 < 1, indicating the tax rate must
be reduced in order to maximize the tax revenue collected.
When it is assumed that Lg> 0, it indicates that legal and illegal
trade are complementary activities for the exporting firm.

This implies that
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once the exporting firm decides to engage in smuggling, the amount of legal
trade the firm engages in will increase and total tax revenues collected by
the government will rise . Under this assumption Lg > 0, the ratio t 1/t0 > 1,
indicating that the tax rate must be increased in order to maximize the tax
revenue collected.
The effect of smuggling on the revenue-maximizing tax rate can also be
explained within the framework of a Laffer Curve, i . e., a tax revenue/tax rate
diagram.

If legal and illegal trade are complementary activities (Lg>O) for

the exporting firm, then the introduction of smuggling will shift the Laffer
Curve up and to the right.

If the initial tax rate remains unchanged after

the shift, it will be to the left of the tax rate that would maximize tax
revenue in the presence of smuggling . On the other hand, if legal and illegal
trade are substitutable activities (Lg<O) for the exporting firm, then the
introduction of smuggling will shift the Laffer Curve down and to the left.
If the initial tax rate remains unchanged after the shift, it will be to the
right of the tax rate that would maximize tax revenue in the presence of
smuggling. 7
The contribution of this paper is to introduce the concept of legal and
illegal trade as being either complementary or substitutable activities for
the exporting firm.

An analysis of the consequences stemming from this

contribution for the revenue maximizing tax rate and tax revenue collected
provides an answer to the contradictory results found in the smuggling
literature on these issues.

7 A graphical exposition of the effect smuggling has on total tax
revenues can be found in the appendix .
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In the clandestine smuggling literature, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973)
demonstrate that the introduction of smuggling reduces tax revenue collected
for a given tax rate.

This result is consistent with legal and illegal trade

being substitutable activities.

A comparison of revenue-maximizing tax rates

under the smuggling and non-smuggling scenarios is not possible with the
Bhagwati and Srinivasan model.

The ranking of the revenue-maximizing tax rate

in the presence of smuggling below the rate for non-smuggling was presented in
a paper by Johnson (1972). His result is consistent with legal and illegal
trade being substitutable activities.

With respect to the relationship

between legal and illegal trade, the results of the clandestine smuggling
literature indicate an implicit assumption of legal and illegal trade being
substitutable activities for the smuggling firm.
In the joint-product smuggling literature the issue of ranking revenuemaximizing tax rates for the smuggling and non-smuggling scenario has not been
addressed.

Pitt (1981), Deardorff and Stolper (1990) and Fausti (1992)

address the comparison of tax revenue collected issue and they arrive at
ambiguous results.8

The ambiguous results would become deterministic and

consistent with the results derived in this paper if an additional assumption
is made with respect to whether legal and illegal trade are substitutable or
complementary activities for the smuggling firm.
Other papers in the joint-product and clandestine smuggling literature
do not address the issue of whether legal and illegal trade are substitutable
or complementary activities. For examples, see Thursby et al. (1991), Sheikh
(1989), Scholer (1989), and Martin and Panagariya (1984).

However, an implied

8 Their results are called ambiguous because a positive level of
smuggling only holds the possibility of increasing tax revenues.
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or overt assumption that legal and illegal trade is either a substitutable or
complementary activity for the firm provides a common strand connecting trade
flows, tax rates, and tax revenue implications discussed in the smuggling
literature.

V.

Federal and State Excise Taxes and Smuggling: A Discussion.9
The "buttlegging" of cigarettes is a type of smuggling that has arisen

in the U.S. because of state excise tax differentials . 10 In a recent paper on
joint-product smuggling by Thursby et al . (1991), commercial interstate
cigarette smuggling between states was used to provide empirical support for
the price disparity phenomena generated in their theoretical model .

The

results of the model presented in this paper suggest that if legal and illegal
interstate commercial trade in cigarettes represent substitutable activities
for the firm, then in high tax states where smuggling is most pervasive the
tax rate should be reduced in order to increase revenues and reduce smuggling
activity.
Smuggling to avoid the federal excise tax on cigarettes is non-existent
today because of tight regulatory control over cigarette manufacturers who are
required to pay the federal excise tax on domestic consumption .

The American

conswner purchased and paid federal and state taxes on 510 billion cigarettes
in 1991. The cigarette industry, however, is not subject to an export tax, and
9 The price effect of state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes is
analogous to a tariff levied on an imported good . The model's results derived
in the previous section can be applied to the cigarette industry based on the
symmetry between import and export taxes as described by Lerner (1936).

° For discussion and empirical analysis of interstate cigarette
smuggling in the U.S . , see Baltagi and Goel (1987), Baltagi and Levin (1986),
Sullivan (1985), and Johnson (1984) .
1
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the industry exported approximately 180 billion cigarettes or 9 billion packs
in 1991. 11
The Clinton administration has suggested that one way to fund health
care reform is to increase the federal cigarette excise tax, by as much as 2
dollars a pack. 12 This action may spawn the type of smuggling found in
Indonesia, Sudan, and other third world countries. 13

These countries

experience under- and over-invoicing of trade goods, misclassification of
traded goods, etc, as firms try to avoid high trade taxes.

If the federal

excise tax becomes high enough, one could see over-invoicing of cigarette
exports or the clandestine smuggling of exported American cigarettes back into
the country . 14

The commencement of this type of illegal activity will affect

tax revenue collection.
The magnitude of the effect will depend on how pervasive smuggling
becomes and whether legal and illegal trade in cigarettes are substitutable or
complementary activities for the smuggling firm .

If they are substitutable

activities, then domestic legal trade in cigarettes will decline as compared
to the non-smuggling situation. As a consequence, actual tax revenues may
fall below projected levels and generate a shortfall in health care reform
ll Additional data on the cigarette industry can be found in the USDA's
Agricultural Statistics Yearbook 19 92.
12

For an insightful discussion on the issue of increasing the federal
excise cigarette tax to fund heath care reform see the article by Warner
(19 93).
13

A discussion of smuggling activity in these countries can be found in
Cooper (1974), Pitt (1981), and Deardorff and Stolper (19 90).
14

The tripling of the California state cigarette excise tax in 1989, and
the large increase in the Canadian cigarette tax in 1991 have generated these
types of smuggling activities. For a discussion of these issues see Bartlett
(19 94).
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funding. However, if they are complementary activities, then legal trade will
increase, compared to the non-smuggling situation.

As a consequence, actual

tax revenue will be above projected levels for the non-smuggling situation.
In either case, illegal activity will increase.
VII. Summary.
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrated that the relationship
between illegal and legal trade determines the effect of smuggling on the
revenue-maximizing tax rate and level of revenues collected.

It was argued

that assumption of legal and illegal trade being substitutable or
complementary activities for the exporting firm was consistent with the
literature on clandestine and joint-product smuggling, respectively.
The results of the analysis were applied to the domestic cigarette
market.

The policy conclusions were based on alternative assumptions of

whether legal and illegal trade were substitutable or complementary activities
for the firm.

However, until the empirical question of "what is the actual

relationship between legal and illegal trade in cigarettes?" is answered, a
policy prescription would be premature.
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VII. APPDIDIX:
Diagram I
Ls < 0

tax revenue

r,

tax rate

In diagram I, the tax revenue function (Laffer Curve)
labeled TR0 represents the before smuggling case. The tax rate
that maximizes tax revenue for this case is labeled t0 • Assume
legal and illegal trade are substitutes. The introduction of
illegal trade causes the total revenue curve to shift in and to
the left, labeled TR1 • The revenue-maximizing tax rate in the
presence of smuggling is now t1 • If legal and illegal trade are
substitutable activities for the exporting firm, then the
introduction of smuggling reduces the revenue-maximizing tax
rate, t1 < to.
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Diagram II

Ls

>

0

tax revenue

Lu

r,

tax rate

In diagram II, the tax revenue function (Laffer curve)
labeled TRo again represents the before smuggling case. The tax
rate that maximizes tax revenue for this case is labeled t0 •
Assume legal and illegal trade are complements. The introduction
of illegal trade causes the total revenue curve to shift out and
to the right, labeled TR 1 • The revenue-maximizing tax rate in the
presence of smuggling is now t1 • If legal and illegal trade are
complementary activities for the exporting firm, then the
introduction of smuggling increases the revenue-maximizing tax
rate, t 1 > t0 •

